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Abstract 
This survey reviews the empirical literature on the impact of environmental policy 
instruments on the rate and direction of technological change. The survey is explicitly 
focused on the empirical identification of the hypothesis to expect a stronger impact from 
market-based incentives than from non-market alternatives. The general picture emerging 
from the recent literature is that there is a clear impact of environmental policy on invention, 
innovation and diffusion of technologies. Although studies on a differential impact are still 
very scarce, the available evidence suggests that innovators look carefully for rent 
opportunities, which in turn depend on the specific incentives signalled by the type of 
(environmental) policy.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Stylized facts on decoupling, i.e. the delinking of economic or income growth and environmental 
pollutants, can be observed in several fields of environmental policy (Brock and Taylor, 2005). 
For instance, acid rain emissions, particularly emissions of SO2, have been greatly reduced in 
OECD countries. One reason for these remarkable reductions is the instalment of new (abatement) 
technologies, such as flue gas desulphurization (FGD) equipment, particularly in those sectors that 
are most responsible for these emissions. This FGD technology became available in an area of 
increasing concerns about the likely impact of acid rain emissions and their contribution to local 
(and distant) air quality. Such concerns gave rise to intensified environmental stringency directed 
at reducing specific pollutants, such as SO2 emissions.  
 The idea that environmental policy is of critical importance to the inducement and 
diffusion of new technologies (‘technological change’ for short) is hardly disputed nowadays. 
Economists long ago pointed at what they called the potential dynamic effects of environmental 
policy. Kneese and Schulze (1975) even claimed that one of the most important criteria on which 
to judge the performance of environmental policy instruments is the extent to which they spur 
new technology toward the efficient conservation of the environment. Accordingly, one would 
expect environmental stringency through emissions restrictions, other than by output reduction or 
factor substitution, to also be a fundamental driver of an increase in research and development 
(R&D) investment in abatement technologies, subsequent filings of new patents and, finally, a 
reduction in emissions. A relatively recent and new literature is precisely concerned with 
demonstrating these effects empirically. 
 Economists also believe that changes in incentives in the background are indispensable. 
In particular, environmental policy, whether through emissions restriction legislation, changes in 
(specific) taxes, subsidies or even tradable permits (TDP), is often considered to be an important 
prerequisite for firms and households to develop and adopt new equipment or technologies with 
more environmentally favourable characteristics. If incentives matter, one would also expect 
different policy instruments to have different effects on the rate and direction of technological 
change. Indeed, economists generally believe that so-called market-based instruments can provide 
stronger incentives than command and control (CAC) regulations to adopt cheaper and better 
pollution-control technologies. First, CAC policies, such as emissions prescriptions for 
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installations, provide no reward for exceeding the requirements set by the regulations. However, 
under a market-based policy, firms that perform better than is required by such regulations face 
continuous rewards because their tax payment can be lowered or they could sell excess pollution 
permits. Moreover, direct regulations constrain the potential ‘space’ for innovation, reducing 
incentives to identify those options that are most cost-effective in the long run.  
 The focus of this survey is whether there is any empirical evidence for the hypothesis that 
market-based incentives would have a stronger impact on the rate and direction of technological 
change than non-market alternatives. This focus distinguishes this survey clearly from some other 
surveys. For instance, Requate (2005) presents a very useful summary of recent developments in 
the theoretical literature on this topic. The surveys by Jaffe, Newell and Stavins (2003 and 2005) 
and Loeschl (2003) mainly focus on the role of technological change in theoretical models, in 
particular on modelling endogenous technological change, and its likely implications for the 
environment. Popp (2005) produces some interesting lessons from his and other people’s recent 
empirical work on innovation as measured by patents. However, his focus is not explicitly on the 
role of instruments, nor does he pay attention to other channels and indicators of the impact of 
environmental policy on technological change. This survey complements and updates the 
assessment of Jaffe, Newell and Stavins (2002) because many relevant studies have become 
available in recent years. The survey is also explicitly concerned with empirical identification of 
relevant mechanisms, including studies that focus on changes in abatement cost. Recent work on 
the effect of instruments on innovation through organizational changes within firms is not 
considered.  
 The survey starts with a demarcation of our topic. Proper identification of the effect of 
different environmental policy instruments is far from obvious. Therefore section 2 explains, first 
of all, the theoretical prediction underlying the hypothesis of a differential dynamic impact of 
different instrument designs in environmental policy. Next, the section reviews the channels 
through which this linkage could be studied empirically and the prerequisites to proper 
identification of this linkage. Section 3 reviews attempts to measure the impact of environmental 
policy on technological change through commonly used indicators of invention, innovation and 
diffusion, such as R&D expenditures, patents and adoption of new technologies. If environmental 
policy (instruments) has a dynamic impact, one would expect invention and innovation to be 
affected first. Indeed, there is a large literature that tries to measure such impacts by looking at 
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changes in the level and direction of R&D and/or its (imperfect) output measure, patents. 
Furthermore, several authors have studied the diffusion of new technology, including studies of 
abatement cost over time. Sections 4 and 5 review studies that explore the likely effects of 
specific instruments on the invention, innovation and diffusion of specific technologies. The 
studies discussed in section 4 identify this linkage for one specific environmental policy 
instrument, and the studies that explicitly consider comparisons between instruments are reviewed 
in section 5. Finally, section 6 sums up the main findings and shortcomings in the current 
literature and provides suggestions for future research. 
2. DYNAMIC EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS 
Economists have long recognized the dynamic impacts of environmental policy (instruments) 
(e.g. Bohm and Russell, 1985), including the potential differential impact of alternative types of 
environmental policy instruments (Orr, 1976). Also, the link between technological change and 
the environment has been on the research agenda of economists for a long time (e.g. Stiglitz, 
1974). Only recently, however, have economists started to provide better micro-foundations to 
these early contributions, in particular by allowing for informational complexities and strategic 
interactions in the regulatory process as well as in the process of technological change. This 
section summarizes both developments and then explains the implications of these advances for 
our field of study, i.e. the empirical identification of different impacts of different environmental 
policy instruments on the rate and direction of technological change.  
2.1 Differential policy impacts and technological change  
The first relevant development in economics is a shift towards a much more detailed analysis of 
the regulatory process in terms of information and strategy. In particular, the analysis of the 
effects of environmental policy design on innovation and diffusion requires a much more explicit 
analysis of the strategy space of both the regulator and the regulated agent. Ranking of policy 
instruments now strongly depends on how timing and commitment problems are solved. This 
literature pays much more attention to the micro-foundation of decisions that characterize 
innovation and diffusion processes in practice, such as decisions about how much to invest in 
R&D or when to adopt a new technology, and their impact on (optimal) regulation. When it 
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comes to characterizing the differences, let alone ranking them, the picture is much less clear-cut 
(Requate, 2005).  
 The other development of interest is the growing attention given to the micro-foundation 
of technological change, which is concisely labelled as endogeneity of technological change.1 The 
underlying mechanisms responsible for economic growth, in particular innovation and diffusion 
of new technology, came to the notice of a wider audience of economists mainly because of 
endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). One important issue is that 
agents’ willingness to invest time or money in research or learning is fraught with public good 
aspects, i.e. the problematic appropriation of its social value. Since the seminal paper of Arrow 
(1962), the standard view is that the investor is often not able to get the full return to his 
investment because new knowledge, once available, is non-rival and only partially excludable 
through instruments such as patents. Moreover, diffusion of new knowledge is less likely to be 
instant and immediate across a heterogeneous population. Add these problems to the standard 
view that the production of environmental quality is associated with externality and public good 
aspects as well, and the complex nature of choosing optimal policy rules in this area is clear (see 
in particular Jaffe, Newell and Stavins, 2005). 
 These advances in economic theory are now used to study the (differential) impact of 
environmental policy on technological change. In particular, the much more detailed analysis of 
the creation and diffusion of new knowledge embodied in technologies has been helpful in 
guiding empirical researchers. Firms typically have to choose how much to invest in R&D to 
facilitate invention, whether to patent the results of this phase (if any) and whether or not to 
produce the new technology or product and commercialize it, i.e. sell it to other firms or 
households. Usually, the first two decisions are labelled ‘invention’ and the third decision 
‘innovation’. Such decisions are not necessarily restricted to existing firms or within one firm, but 
are equally likely for new firms or more than one firm. In fact, many firms originate by solving 
this particular (sub)set of decisions in entirely new ways. Apart from the creation of new 
technologies and markets, a look at the process that induces firms or households to buy or adopt 
                                                     
1.  Recently, attention has shifted to the link between technological change or innovation on the one hand and 
(economic) growth on the other hand (see, for instance, Aghion et al., 2005) as well as to the underlying 
incentives that fuel innovation (Aghion and Tirole, 1994). 
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new technologies or products once available at the market is also important. This process is 
usually labelled diffusion.2  
 Note that the effect of environmental policy on the rate and direction of technological 
change also concerns household decisions. Basically, household investment decisions, such as 
buying a new refrigerator, are also adoption decisions of new technology already available at the 
market, but there is some evidence that such decisions of households are quite different from 
those of firms, apart from the scale of the investment (DeCanio and Watkins, 1998). So we take it 
that the diffusion phase typically also includes the penetration of new technologies or products to 
households. Note that the cumulative economic or environmental impact of new technology or 
products results from all three of these stages and is collectively labelled as the process of 
technological change (Jaffe, Newell and Stavins, 2002, p. 43). 
 Economists strongly agree that different types of regulation matter for the rate and 
direction of technological change. Why one might expect a differential impact of environmental 
policy instruments on technological change can now easily be understood using Figure 1. This 
figure illustrates technological change as an inward shift of the abatement cost curve. The idea 
behind this shift could be explained as follows. Assume a profit maximizing firm produces output 
Qp in the status quo and faces the introduction of a tax t* on its emissions to internalize the 
marginal damage associated with its production (MDC). Then it may avoid paying Ot*XQp by 
reducing waste or adopting currently available and relatively inexpensive add-on technologies 
described by the marginal abatement cost curve MAC0(E). Equivalent incentives could be 
expected from CAC regulation that forces the firm to adopt this technology and produce at Q*. 
With a tax or (yearly) auctioned tradable permits (TDP), the firm still faces additional payments 
equal to 0t*SQ*. To avoid paying for the remaining emissions infinitely, this (or other) firm(s) 
could also invest in invention or innovation to develop new abatement equipment with lower 
remaining emissions and therefore lower tax payments. If successful, the production possibility 
set is shifted outwards (higher emissions abatement for a given input), which induces an inward 
shift of the abatement cost curve (lower costs per unit of emissions abated). This technology, 
labelled MAC1(E), reduces tax payments substantially to Ot*YQ1. So as long as the costs of the 
new investment are below the tax savings Q1YSQ*, it pays the firm to adopt the new technology. 
                                                     
2. Note that this distinction associates learning with diffusion of technology and/or knowledge across agents 
(firms, households) and R&D with innovation, i.e. invention and application of new technology and/or 
knowledge. 
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Figure 1. Dynamic incentives from environmental regulation 
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Such incentives for invention and innovation do not exist if a firm does not expect future CAC 
regulations to be stricter than those currently applied, say at the level of Q*. If the firm complies 
with these regulations and abatement costs MAC0(E) are sunk, no additional benefits can be 
expected from investing in the new abatement equipment labelled MAC1(E). However, if the firm 
expects future regulations to be stricter, there remain strong incentives to invest in the 
development of new technologies.3 The firm would save Q1ZSQ* from the new technology under 
this new regulation, which could even be more than savings under a tax scheme.  
 Note also the remarkable difference between a tax and a TDP system. Whereas the tax t* 
will remain at its original level unless the government explicitly decides to change it, the tradable 
permit price will automatically be lower in equilibrium (given by P*) because of the induced shift 
of the MAC curve. As a result, pollution will be higher (Q2 > Q1). The new abatement options 
reduce the shadow price of pollution, which is reflected in the new permit price and pollution 
                                                     
3. Firms might also anticipate that investment in new (cost-efficient) technologies could be observed by the 
regulator, who in turn could respond by tougher regulation. Such expectations clearly make innovation and 
diffusion more costly.  
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level, and could also be seen as a rebound effect of the new invention. So much depends upon the 
timing and commitment of the regulatory policy, which also basically explains why the literature 
no longer conveys the simple message explained in the previous paragraph. It should be noted, 
however, that the original conjecture that additional dynamic incentives apply to taxes and 
(yearly) auctioned permits is still valid ceteris paribus, i.e. in a static framework with an 
equivalent regulatory outcome.  
2.2 Identification issues  
Only a small empirical literature studies the differential impact of instruments on technological 
change. This is hardly surprising. First of all, environmental regulation mainly uses CAC 
instruments, and the use of market-based instruments is (still) rather limited (Stavins, 2003). 
Second, the same environmental issue is often tackled with a mix or cocktail of instruments, i.e. 
different instruments, such as (technology) standards, taxes and subsidies, at the same time. From 
an econometric perspective, nothing, in principle, prevents identification of the effect of different 
instruments in these circumstances. However, such evaluations require many detailed (micro-)data 
which are often not available. Third, the alternative approach of comparing the use of instruments 
in more or less similar circumstances is also rarely used in practice. Although such so-called field 
experiments also produce reliable effect estimates (Train, 1994), concerns about unequal 
treatment of agents often prevent this kind of experiment in practice. Fourth, studies that compare 
instruments in environments where economic conditions are controlled (such as in an 
experimental setting) are also virtually non-existent.  
 Despite these problems with measuring the differential impact of instruments directly, an 
increasing amount of material has become available that documents the impact of environmental 
policy on technological change. First, some studies have looked at inducement in a more 
environmentally-friendly direction at a fairly general level in several areas (see also Jaffe, Newell 
and Stavins, 2002). Furthermore, some evidence is now available for ‘stand-alone’ evaluation of 
instruments, which enables comparison of effects across studies. Third, some direct (and indirect) 
evidence exists as to whether price or quantity regulation makes a difference in a number of cases 
where market instruments have been applied, in particular in the US.  
 The overall hypothesis is that (different) instruments are likely to have a (differential) 
impact on technological change. More specifically, the question is whether market-based 
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incentives have a stronger impact on the rate and direction of technological change than non-
market alternatives. In the early days of environmental regulation, the focus was almost entirely 
on standard-setting or technology prescriptions (in particular, ‘best available techniques’). This 
encouraged the adoption of so-called add-on technologies, such as scrubbers. When it appeared to 
the parties involved that these signals would remain and were likely to become even more 
stringent, firms also started to engage in the development of entirely new (add-on) technologies, 
sometimes called ‘integrated technology’. This process can be observed in many areas, such as 
water sanitation and purification, air pollution control (smog, acid rain particles, etc.) and waste 
management. The same holds for technologies that are both directly and indirectly responsible for 
emissions, such as energy-generating technologies or energy-consuming technologies and 
products. After an initial phase of retrofitting, usually a search starts for a technology design that 
tackles concerns about energy and/or emission efficiency from the very beginning.  
 Against this background, I explain how the overall hypothesis could be tested and what 
indicators might identify this interaction. First of all, the introduction of environmental policy and 
its subsequent prolongation signals to (new) producers whether or not it is profitable to engage in 
R&D.4 If it is, one would expect to observe a rise in R&D activity specifically dedicated to the 
invention of new technologies (products) or the improvement of existing ones. Invention of new 
technologies (products) is usually identified by proxies that: 
• measure the (cost of) input to (additional) R&D, such as number of researchers or R&D 
‘expenditures’; 
• measure observable output, such as number of patents and their citations.  
Note that spillovers and economies of scale in research complicate the identification of R&D 
input specifically dedicated to environmental technology, in particular if we consider integrated 
technology. Measuring invention of new technologies through patents also has drawbacks. For 
instance, firms may not always patent to protect their rents or may ‘over’-patent as strategic 
deterrence (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002). Also, invention of new 
products is hard to observe directly and is usually only observed through indicators for 
innovation. Citations of patents account for the relative importance of different patents or can be 
used to show knowledge flows among inventors. 
                                                     
4. In the current theoretical literature on environmental policy, it is crucial to distinguish between the possible 
timing and commitment strategies of the regulator and the firm, where each of them can be assumed to 
move first. 
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 If it appears that environmental stringency is not a casual exercise, and perhaps even 
cycles of increasing regulatory stringency might be expected, one is also likely to see more 
inventions being commercialized. Innovation is an activity that uses inventions as a starting point 
where R&D staff is often no longer involved. The outcome is usually implementation of new 
technologies in the production process or new marketable products. So innovation proxies for new 
technologies and products are: 
• measures of inputs, such as marketing staff using the available stock of patents; 
• measures of output, such as entirely new technologies or products, changes in physical 
characteristics of already existing technologies or products, and changes in the cost per 
unit of abated emission. 
Note that output measures of innovation could typically be observed by looking both at 
production processes of firms using new technologies and at typical products sold to consumers, 
because innovation is typically a marketed invention that could be sold either to firms (new 
technologies) or to consumers (new products).  
 Finally, environmental regulation is also likely to play a role when it comes to the 
diffusion of these innovations. Diffusion of a new technology or product reflects the ultimate 
impact of a particular invention and its subsequent innovation. In particular, the size of the market 
for a new technology or product is likely to depend on the number of regulated firms. If, for 
instance, the government provides a tax credit for specific investments, one is likely to observe a 
faster and stronger penetration of those investments. Proxies to measure this impact are: 
• measures of scale, such as number of firms or households that typically use this new 
technology or product, but also exit of firms that do not innovate; 
• measures of cost improvements, such as change in (overall) abatement costs. 
Note also that market exit is an indicator of innovation.5 One would not expect the firms leaving a 
regulated market to be a random selection, but typically to be those firms that have substantial 
problems in adapting to the new (regulatory) environment. This process might be difficult to 
observe, however, because new regulatory regimes are typically phased in gradually, applying 
first to new ‘entrants’ and then to incumbent firms if they switch to new vintages (Levinson, 
1999). Abatement cost changes are another indicator of the adoption of new technology. Lower 
                                                     
5. One might call this the ‘inverted’ Porter hypothesis. According to the Porter hypothesis (Porter and van der 
Linde, 1995), (certain) innovative firms could gain from regulation and, in addition, could even have a 
positive effect on overall economic growth. 
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abatement cost for a given emissions reduction activity is likely to reflect the arrival of either new 
technologies (‘innovation’) or cost savings from the use of a given technology on a wider scale 
(‘diffusion’ or ‘learning’). As economists typically expect abatement cost to rise for a given 
emissions–output production possibility set, reductions in abatement cost are often seen as an 
indicator of dynamic effects.  
3. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND INDUCED TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE 
This section reviews the empirical literature on the impact of environmental policy on 
technological change at a general level. The papers that focus on this linkage are summarized in 
Table 1. From the theory, we know that innovation and diffusion respond to changes in relative 
prices (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Acemoglu, 2002). Hence, changes in the rate and direction of 
technological change can also be induced by purposive changes in relative prices, for instance by 
a regulator who introduces emissions taxes. Note also that CAC regulation has such an impact 
because this raises the (implicit) price of emissions (e.g. Copeland and Taylor, 2003; Fullerton, 
2002). Technology choice (including investment in invention) is also likely to be affected by 
indirect mechanisms that have a beneficial effect on the environment. For instance, a rise in the 
energy price would shift technological change towards less energy-intensive technologies, the use 
of which, in turn, also reduces emissions as long as energy and emissions are complements. 
 Popp (2002) is perhaps the most important recent study that confirms the role of prices in 
inducing technological change to date. This paper contains clear econometric evidence that the 
filing of US patents is sensitive to changes in relative prices, in particular between 1970 and 1994. 
Specifically, Popp shows that rising fossil fuel prices, in particular oil and gas prices, raise the 
cost of this type of energy use (and its associated emissions) and induce patents (and citations) for 
energy-saving technologies. Technology groups such as fuel cells, use of waste as fuel or for heat 
production, and coal gasification have clearly benefited from the changes in energy prices over 
time. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates the importance of the usefulness of the (endogenous) 
existing knowledge stock. Popp constructs productivity estimates to measure this usefulness. Not 
taking this quality of the knowledge stock into account is likely to create omitted variable bias 
when estimating the effect of energy prices on patents.  
 To identify the link between environmental regulation and technological change, one 
would like to look at the consequences of (changes in) the stringency of regulation for existing 
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firms or sectors as measured by its implied (changes in) shadow prices. For instance, if regulation 
is currently not binding, the shadow price for specific elements of the environment (or emissions) 
as an input is zero and no effects are to be expected. If (expected) regulation becomes binding, the 
(expected) price becomes positive and firms start to exploit several mechanisms to reduce 
emissions or the cost of abatement, such as output reduction, substitution of inputs or direct 
abatement (see Smulders and Vollebergh, 2001). Future (expected) costs can be reduced by 
investing in (‘environmental’) R&D that, if successful, is likely to reduce future abatement costs.  
 The available empirical papers, however, follow a somewhat different path. Because 
shadow prices are usually unavailable, stringency is measured through proxies. The most often 
used proxy is the measure of pollution abatement cost (PAC). This indicator has the advantage 
that it captures cost consequences of different types of regulation at the firm or sector level, and 
therefore aggregates implications across different policy dimensions. A set of studies in the late 
1990s used PAC to demonstrate an association between higher abatement cost and the propensity 
to invest in productive R&D and its likely output, filed patents for environmental technologies. 
Lanjouw and Mody (1996) were the first to show that this association can be measured across the 
world. Using patent data at the country level between 1971 and 1988, they explored the number 
and distribution of environmentally related patents and their diffusion across the world. They 
found a substantial rate of concentration of such patents, in particular in Germany, Japan and the 
US. Environmental regulation as measured through PAC as a percentage of GDP also correlates 
with the share of environmental patents in the total number of patents for these countries. 
Lanjouw and Mody also observed that innovators in developing countries obtained a non-trivial 
number of patents and that substantial imports of foreign patents occurred. 
 Jaffe and Palmer (1997) explored the association between environmental policy and 
technological change at the industry level for the US. Using patents as well as measures of R&D 
between 1974 and 1991, they found that there is a significant correlation within industries over 
time between the rate of (lagged) expenditure on pollution abatement and the level of R&D 
spending, although the magnitude of this effect is small. Furthermore, no such correlation could 
be observed with overall patenting. In contrast to the latter finding, Brunnermeier and Cohen 
(2003) reported a positive correlation when also including the number of inspections as a measure 
for the intensity of regulation. In their study of the US manufacturing sector between 1982 and 
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1992, patents respond to increases in PAC but not to increased enforcement. They also found that 
industries that are internationally competitive are more likely to innovate.  
 Two papers of particular interest are Becker and Henderson (2000) and Greenstone 
(2002). These papers focus on the role of entry and exit of firms in response to environmental 
regulation, which is an indicator of Schumpeterian dynamics. Both papers use attainment status of 
US counties as a proxy for differences in environmental regulation.6 Becker and Henderson 
(2000) examine unintended effects of air quality regulation using US plant data for 1967–92. 
They use the differential in regulatory stringency as revealed by the annual designation of county 
air quality attainment status, which has been applied since 1978. The regulator uses this tool as an 
incentive mechanism, with greater regulatory oversight – including specific equipment 
requirements – on plants in non-attainment areas and more favourable regulation in attainment 
areas. As a consequence, plant births are reduced in non-attainment areas by 26–45%, with bigger 
(polluting) industries and sectors being affected the most. The industrial structure also shifts 
toward less regulated single-plant firms in these areas, whereas large pre-regulation plants benefit 
from grandfathered provisions, but at the expense of environmental degradation.  
 Similar evidence is reported by Greenstone (2002), who looks at these effects at an even 
more detailed level. Not only does his study operationalize environmental stringency through a 
simultaneous evaluation of all air regulation, but he also studies effects on employment, capital 
stock and shipments for existing and newly opened plants. He also reports a substantial decline in 
manufacturing activity in non-attainment counties, although it has been modest compared with 
that in the entire manufacturing sector. Accordingly, both papers nicely document the decline of 
polluting industries.  
 These findings seem to provide little support for the idea that environmental regulation 
might trigger ‘win-win’ situations at an aggregated level (Porter and van der Linde, 1995). 
However, this might still hide potential ‘win-win’ effects within the polluting industry if the 
cleaner firms have gained relative to the polluting firms within that industry (ceteris paribus the 
overall decline of that industry). The likely existence of a first ‘win’ has been demonstrated by 
Snyder, Miller and Stavins (2003) when studying the effect of environmental regulation 
(dummies) on the adoption of membrane cell technology and the exit of firms within US chlorine 
                                                     
6. Attainment status also captures – at least implicitly – what is called ‘new source bias’ of regulations, i.e. 
the fact that the phase-in of new regulation is often a gradual process, with new plants or firms facing the 
strictest regulations (compare also Levinson (1999) and a recent paper by Bushnell and Wolfram (2006)). 
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manufacturing plants over the period 1976–2001. They report that regulation increases the price 
of chlorine and leads to the exit of facilities using environmentally inferior options. Interestingly, 
adoption of this technology was not found to be directly affected by this regulation. In other 
words, without switching to the more beneficial technology, firms have a larger chance of exiting 
the industry. Whether this has left the remaining firms to actually gain from this regulation (the 
second win) is still unclear, however.  
 Economists typically also ask whether environmental regulation has a detrimental effect 
on aggregate productivity, for instance because of crowding-out effects on R&D (Smulders and 
De Nooij, 2003). When a given dollar of investment is spent on (research in) pollution reduction, 
other potentially more productivity-enhancing options are no longer possible. To assess whether 
such crowding-out effects are present at the sectoral level, Shadbegian and Gray (2005) study 
abatement cost in sectors where they are relatively large, in particular in paper mills, oil refineries 
and steel mills. Pollution abatement costs are defined as capital expenditures and operating cost, 
including labour, materials and depreciation, to reduce emissions to air, water or ground 
(including waste reduction).7 Their measure of productivity distinguishes explicitly between 
traditional output and ‘environmental output’ to account for what they call the ‘mismeasurement 
effect’, i.e. productivity measures that do not differentiate between these different goals of input 
use. Using a micro-dataset for plants in the three sectors, they find that abatement expenditures 
contribute little or nothing to production but also have no statistically significant effects on the 
productivity of non-abatement expenditures. Further decompositions to allow for heterogeneity in 
production technologies within these sectors provide little evidence for differences across these 
groups.  
 
 
                                                     
7. PACs in most industrial sectors are well below 1.0% of total production costs, but they are much higher for 
the sectors studied by Shadbegian and Gray. 
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Table 1. Empirical studies of the effect of environmental policy on technological change 
Authors Main focus Policy driver and indicator Dataset Main result 
Popp (2002) Innovation 
Energy price on patents of energy 
supply and demand technologies and 
citations 
US energy patent data 1970–
94 and productivity estimates 
using citations 
Energy prices and quality of existing (stock of) knowledge 
strongly affect innovation 
Lanjouw and 
Mody (1996) Innovation 
Environmental regulation (PAC) on 
share of environmental / total number 
of patents Country data 1971–88 
Share between 0.6% and 3% in Germany, Japan and US; 
patents correlate with PAC for these countries; imports of 
foreign patents substantial in developing countries 
Jaffe and 
Palmer (1997) 
Invention and 
innovation 
Environmental regulation (PAC) on 
R&D expenditure and patents 
US manufacturing sector 
panel data 1974–91 
Lagged PAC has a positive effect on R&D expenditure but 
little effect on patents  
Brunnermeier 
and Cohen 
(2003) Innovation 
Environmental regulation (PACE and 
inspections) on patents 
146 US manufacturing sector 
panel data 1982–92 
Patents respond to increase in PAC but not to increased 
enforcement; internationally competitive industries more 
likely to innovate 
Becker and 
Henderson 
(2000) Diffusion 
Environmental regulation (CAA – 
attainment or not) on plant births 
Large dataset on plants in four 
manufacturing sectors 1967–
92 
Differential in county air quality attainment status favours 
attainment areas, reducing births for polluting industries in 
non-attainment areas; large pre-regulation plants benefit 
from grandfathering 
Greenstone 
(2002) Diffusion 
Environmental regulation (CAA – 
attainment or not) on measures of 
industrial activity (incl plant births) 
US plant data set 1967-1987 
(1.75 mln observations) 
CAAAs substantially retarded the growth of polluting 
manufacturers in nonattainment counties; decline was 
modest compared to size of entire manufacturing sector 
Snyder, Miller 
and Stavins 
(2003) 
Innovation 
and diffusion 
Environmental regulation (dummies) 
on adoption of membrane cell 
technology and exit of firms 
51 US chlorine manufacturing 
plants 1976–2001 
Regulation increases price of chlorine and as a result exit 
of facilities using environmentally inferior options; 
adoption of technology not directly affected (hazard 
model) 
Shadbegian and 
Gray (2005)  
Environmental regulation (PAC) on 
productivity  
68 US paper mills, 55 oil 
refineries and 27 steel mills 
1979–90 
Abatement expenditures contribute little or nothing to 
production, but also do not affect productivity of non-
abatement  
CAA = Clean Air Act 
PAC = pollution abatement costs 
PACE = pollution abatement and control expenditures 
  15
In conclusion, environmental regulation has a serious impact on technological change in general. 
Regulation makes life more difficult for existing firms by increasing the (implicit) price of 
pollution, but it also has a clear positive impact on invention and innovation of new technologies. 
Also, indirect evidence suggests that rising implicit prices of emissions boost patents in 
complementary areas. The use of pollution abatement cost as a proxy to measure the stringency of 
environmental policy may also have drawbacks. For example, the way in which PAC is measured 
does not account for technological change in abatement at all (Iovanna, Maguire and McGartland, 
2003), which might help explain why its level appears rather constant (as a percentage of GDP) 
over time (see Brock and Taylor, 2004).8 A final note is that almost all studies deal exclusively 
with US environmental policy; therefore little is known about peculiarities of circumstances 
affecting results in other countries.  
4. POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND INDUCED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
A different approach is to study the effects of specific instruments on invention, innovation or 
diffusion of specific technologies. The set of studies discussed in this section identify this effect 
for one specific environmental policy instrument; studies that explicitly consider comparisons 
between instruments are reviewed in the next section. The papers are ordered in relation to 
whether CAC or market-based instruments are analysed and are summarized in Table 2. Studies 
that consider technological change only implicitly are not included.9 
 That environmental policy does affect technological change is basically confirmed in all 
studies, with perhaps one exception. In particular, Bellas (1998) reports no technological progress 
from standards on flue gas desulphurization (FGD) units at coal-burning plants. Using changes in 
present-value FGD expenditures over the lifetime of (old and new) units as the dependent 
variable, with installation year as a proxy for vintage, he finds only weak evidence for some cost 
advantages of new units over older ones. At least as important is his finding that the operating 
costs of an existing unit decrease over time. During his observation period, 1970–91, stringency 
                                                     
8. PACs may provide a measure of external regulatory pressures that induce technological change, but some 
PACs are notoriously difficult to measure (e.g. the PAC component of a new investment project that makes 
a plant both cleaner and more productive). 
9.  Examples are studies measuring the effectiveness of policy instruments without looking explicitly at their 
implications for either abatement technologies or cost, such as Berkhout, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Muskens’s 
(2004) evaluation of the effect of energy taxes on household consumption of energy and Fullerton and 
Kinnaman’s (1996) evaluation of the effect of waste taxes on the level and composition of household 
waste. 
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of regulation of new units is determined, in part, by state-of-the-art pollution abatement 
technology. So any potential rent for the firm due to cost reduction from installing a new and 
better unit is subsumed by the regulator (by increasing stringency). An existing unit is likely to be 
governed by standards that existed when the unit began operation. Because any cost saving from 
such a unit would be retained by the firm itself, the firm has a strong incentive to improve 
operation – which is exactly what has been observed.  
 Popp (2006a) also explicitly considers the effect of a specific type of regulation (i.e. 
standards for NOx and SO2 emissions) on technological change in three countries – the US, 
Germany and Japan – between 1970 and 2000. As in his other studies, he measures this change 
through the filing of patents and, in this case, citations as well. As this regulation was explicitly 
focused on abatement of NOx and SO2 emissions, it is interesting to see that patents of air 
pollution control equipment respond so strongly. Popp reports that inventors respond to 
environmental regulatory pressure in their own country, but not to foreign environmental 
regulations. Citations of existing patents show that domestic inventors are building on earlier 
Japanese technology. The latter finding suggests that technology transfers mainly appear 
indirectly, and firms adapt foreign inventions to local circumstances.  
 In another study, Popp (2006b) looks at the interaction between invention and innovation 
on the one hand, and the diffusion of knowledge through embodied abatement technology by a 
specific set of regulated firms, i.e. US coal-fired power plants, on the other. The narrow focus on 
patents and adoption of NOx pollution control equipment provides an excellent opportunity to 
explore the interaction of supply and demand of new (abatement) technology in response to 
emissions regulation, in this case NOx standards in the US. Popp considers the creation of a patent 
data knowledge stock between 1970 and 2002, and abatement technology adoption of the very 
same technologies by 996 US coal-fired power plants between 1990 and 2002. He finds that 
technological advances, in particular abroad, are important for the adoption of newer post-
combustion treatment technologies. Again, adaptive R&D by US firms can be observed before 
foreign inventions are adopted. He also finds that expectations of future technological advances 
delay adoption. 
 Clearly, both studies by Popp confirm the previous finding that CAC policy does affect 
technological change. The somewhat anomalous finding by Bellas might be due to the different 
indicator used and the period observed to measure this change. Popp (2005) has argued that 
  17
measuring technological change through variations in the time trend might not be a proper way to 
measure inducement because it only captures the overall effect of technological change. 
Technological change in these empirical models is typically measured as a time-related change in 
(energy or environmental) productivity, having controlled for changes in labour, capital and 
energy inputs. This does not tell us anything about likely changes in the nature (‘direction’) of the 
technologies used. Patent data can be used to measure such changes directly. 
 Three papers have looked explicitly at the effect of earmarked taxes, i.e. tax-cum-rebate 
schemes, on innovation or diffusion in three different European countries.10 Kemp (1998) shows 
that diffusion of biological effluent treatment plants in the Dutch food and beverage industry 
between 1974 and 1991 has been sensitive to the Dutch water effluent charge. In particular, he 
reports that the timing of the adoption of such plants has been influenced strongly. This result 
confirms the idea that prospective adopters trade-off the costs of effluent treatment against the 
savings on effluent tax payments. Kemp also finds that adoption strongly depends on firm-specific 
characteristics, such as the use of investment selection criteria which cannot be directly controlled 
by the regulator. Unfortunately, this study does not explicitly control for the CAC regulation that 
affected these firms at the same time. 
 The study by Millock and Nauges (2006) evaluates the effect of a tax-cum-rebate scheme 
in France using observations for 226 plants from three industrial sectors between 1995 and 1998. 
Under this scheme, SO2, NOx and HCl emissions are taxed and the revenue is returned to the 
sector. The authors report that this instrument has contributed to the reduction in emissions of 
SO2, NOx and HCl, but the abatement elasticity with regard to the tax is quite small.  
 Höglund Isaksson (2005) studies the effect of the Swedish NOx charge implemented in 
1992. The revenues from this charge are refunded net of transaction costs and firms receive 
output-based instead of emissions-based refunds. The drawback of output-based refunding is that 
diffusion of abatement technology is hampered because firms may strategically prevent 
information disclosure to other firms. Looking at abatement cost (PAC) changes for 162 energy 
abatement measures implemented in 114 combustion plants, Höglund Isaksson estimates that 
extensive emissions reduction has taken place at very low cost. She also finds that learning and 
                                                     
10. Tax-cum-rebate schemes are an example of the two-part instrument found to be an optimal incentive 
scheme when pollution or emissions are considered as inputs (see Fullerton and Wolverton, 2005). Under 
such a scheme, the polluter pays a deposit for using the environment as an input and receives a rebate when 
he abates emissions. Accordingly, only net emissions are taxed under this scheme. 
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technological development in abatement are present. Note that the remarkable differences in 
abatement elasticities between her study and Millock and Nauges (2006) might be explained by 
the fact that the Swedish charge is 100 times higher than the French NOx tax studied in the 
latter.11 
 Subsidies have always met scepticism among economists (see Baumol and Oates, 1988). 
Indeed, from recent surveys of the adoption literature (Requate, 2005) and market-based 
instruments (Stavins, 2003), it is clear that the economics profession has focused predominantly 
on pollution taxes, tradable pollution permits and quotas. Despite the fact that the subsidy 
instrument is not popular among economists, it is actually quite often used in practice. Subsidies 
appear in many forms: not only are explicit investment subsidies widely used, but also tax 
deductibility schemes are very common – including investment credits, accelerated depreciation, 
partial expensing, and exemptions (Jenkins and Lamech, 1992; Price et al., 2005; OECD, 2006).  
 One widely studied subsidy programme has been the Demand Side Management (DSM) 
programme operated by US electric utilities in the 1990s. Empirical evidence from this 
programme seems to support the economists’ belief that subsidies are ineffective and inefficient. 
Hassett and Metcalf (1995) show, however, that energy-conservation credits given to households 
have been effective in stimulating the penetration of modern energy-saving technologies. Using 
much better (panel) data at the household level than previous studies, their estimated coefficients 
suggest that subsidies have been effective after all. When including unobservable individual 
characteristics, such as ‘taste’ for conservation, they find that US households invested in energy-
saving technologies, such as insulation and replacing furnace burners. With these proper controls, 
they find that consumers do respond in a rational way to the energy-conservation incentives of a 
tax credit.12 Hassett and Metcalf (1995, p. 213) reproduce previous results showing no, or even 
adverse, effects when not controlling for these unobservable characteristics. 
 
                                                     
11. The French tax is EUR 0.04573 per kg NOx whereas the Swedish charge is EUR 4.4 per kg. 
12.  Nonetheless, Hassett and Metcalf admit that their result adds little to the knowledge of the deadweight loss 
attached to this subsidy scheme due to so-called ‘free riders’, i.e. those agents who in the absence of the 
subsidy would still have invested in energy-saving technologies. Some studies report that the number of 
agents whose behaviour is not affected by the subsidy would be high (e.g. Malm, 1996; Wirl and Orasch, 
1998; Wirl, 2000).  
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Table 2. Empirical studies of impact of specific environmental policy instruments 
Authors Main focus Policy driver and indicator Dataset Main result 
Command and control instruments 
Bellas (1998) Innovation 
Standards for flue gas 
desulphurization (FGD) on design, 
performance and abatement cost  
144 FGD units in US power 
plants 1970–91 
No significant technological progress reported (time 
trend!), but operating costs decrease over time 
Popp (2006a) 
Invention and 
innovation  
NOx and SO2 regulation on air 
pollution control equipment 
Patent and citations data for 
US, Germany and Japan 
1970–2000 
Inventors respond to environmental regulatory pressure in 
their own country, but not to foreign environmental 
regulations; any technology transfer appears indirect 
Popp (2006b) 
Invention, 
innovation and 
diffusion 
NOx regulation on patents and 
adoption of NOx pollution control 
equipment 
Patent data knowledge stock 
1970–2002 and 996 US coal-
fired power plants 1990–2002 
Technological advances, particularly abroad, are important 
for adoption of newer post-combustion treatment 
technologies; adaptive R&D by US firms necessary before 
foreign innovations adopted 
Market-based instruments 
Kemp (1998) Diffusion 
Water effluent charge on diffusion 
pattern of biological effluent 
treatment plants 
77 Dutch food and beverage 
plants 1974–91 
Water charge stimulated early adoption of biological 
effluent treatment plants 
Millock and 
Nauges (2006) Diffusion 
Tax (on SO2, NOx and HCl) on 
emissions with subsidy on emissions 
abatement  
226 French plants from three 
industrial sectors 1995–98  
Tax reduces emissions of SO2, NOx and HCl, but 
abatement elasticity with regard to the tax is quite small 
Höglund 
Isaksson (2005) Innovation 
NOx charge on abatement cost (PAC) 
changes  
162 energy abatement 
measures of 114 Swedish 
combustion plants 1990–96  
Extensive reduction at low cost; learning and technological 
development in abatement would be present 
Hassett and 
Metcalf (1995) Diffusion 
Energy tax credit on residential 
conservation investment 
37,658 US households 1979–
81  
Energy tax credits increase probability of investment in 
energy-saving technology 
Aalbers et al. 
(2007) Diffusion 
Adoption subsidy on investment in 
expensive innovative technology Managers in experiment 
Strong behavioural impact of subsidy in experimental 
setting for managers  
DeCanio and 
Watkins (1998) Diffusion 
Voluntary Green Lights programme 
on energy-saving investment 
decisions by firms 
9,548 US companies with 268 
participants 
Firm characteristics matter for participation in and 
commitment to programme 
Klaassen et al. 
(2005) 
Innovation 
and diffusion 
R&D and adoption subsidy on cost-
reducing innovation  
Wind turbine farms in 
Denmark, Germany and UK 
Estimation supports two-factor learning curve (‘learning 
by doing’ and ‘learning by searching’) and homogeneous 
learning curves for the three countries 
PAC = pollution abatement costs 
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In what is perhaps the first experimental study on the behavioural impact of environmental policy 
instruments, Aalbers et al. (2007) analyse the impact of technology adoption subsidies on 
investment behaviour in an individual choice experiment in which managers from firms 
participated. By using an economic experiment, the authors are able to construct the decision 
environment of agents in such a way that they all essentially face the same investment decision 
under slightly different circumstances. Moreover, the experimental setting is such that decision-
makers also face binding time constraints, to mimic the decision situations in which managers in 
small and medium enterprises find themselves. In these smaller firms, there is insufficient 
managerial time available to search for the best available technology and, at the same time, follow 
the output market sufficiently closely to maximize profits (see DeCanio, 1998). Aalbers et al. find 
that subsidies are highly effective as an incentive mechanism even if only a small (expensive) 
subset of available technologies are subsidized and the subsidy does not make these technologies 
profitable. The managers realize much higher savings in the treatment with subsidy than in the 
treatment without subsidy. Furthermore, the subsidies seem to induce more radical choice 
behaviour: either managers adopt (very) early or they do not purchase a technology at all.  
 The importance of firm characteristics for the effectiveness of environmental policy in 
general and the diffusion of new technology in particular has also been nicely demonstrated by 
DeCanio and Watkins (1998). They report that self-selection of firms participating in the 
voluntary Green Lights programme of the US Environmental Protection Agency is evident. Even 
when controlling for firm-specific differences in risk classes, firms tend to differ systematically 
rather than randomly when participating in the programme. It appears that Green Lights 
membership is positively associated with good performance by firms and with sectoral and 
regional characteristics that suggest the importance of informational diffusion.  
 A final study of interest is the case study by Klaassen et al. (2005) on the support for 
wind turbines in Germany, Denmark and the UK. As explained in their paper, progress in wind 
turbine technology and the accumulated experience in producing wind turbines are likely to be 
affected by initial R&D subsidies and a gradual shift towards adoption subsidies to increase 
demand in a later stage.13 The findings of Klaassen et al. suggest similar learning curves for the 
                                                     
13. The innovation and diffusion mechanism is studied here using a so-called two-factor learning curve, which 
is a typical bottom-up perspective on the development and spread of new technologies. According to this 
concept, cost reductions for particular technologies arise out of two kinds of learning. The first mechanism 
is called ‘searching’ and typically arises because of investment in the stock of R&D (and its lagged effect). 
The second mechanism is labelled ‘learning by doing’, but this concept is somewhat more general here, 
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different countries. Import indicators for the UK (80%) and Germany (40%) reflect a leading role 
for Denmark, which is hardly surprising because Denmark supported investment in innovation for 
windmills much earlier than the other countries. Accordingly, this case study provides casual 
evidence for the Porter hypothesis, although it remains unclear whether environmental policy is 
beneficial in this case even beyond the environmental dividend itself. Moreover, a case study can 
never generate a general confirmation of any hypothesis, but it does seem to give some indication 
that at some specific place and time, environmental policy might be favourable to growth in 
particular sectors. 
 The studies reviewed in this section all explicitly deal with specific environmental 
instruments and their likely effect on invention, innovation or diffusion. They often claim that 
such effects exist, but their identification is not always convincing. Moreover, the studies are hard 
to compare. First of all, instruments have specific design features that determine their incentives, 
which in turn are likely to have an impact on their effectiveness. Second, local circumstances tend 
to differ and isolation of policy effects is usually very difficult. Third, specific indicators used to 
measure technological change may differ. The overall impression, though, is that environmental 
policy instruments, whether they are CAC or market-based, have a clear impact on technological 
change. To find out more about their differential dynamic impact, we now turn to studies that take 
this perspective explicitly into account. 
5. DIFFERENTIAL DYNAMIC IMPACT OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
This section reviews studies that explicitly analyse the differential impacts from different types of 
environmental policy instruments on technological change. For a long time, comparisons have 
only used indirect evidence, because of the lack of market-based instruments in practice and/or 
the availability of data to evaluate them. In particular, several studies have looked at CAC versus 
energy price effects. Only recently have some papers become available that compare the effects of 
CAC instruments versus market-based instruments for some interesting cases. The papers are 
summarized in Table 3. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
because it allows not only for improvements in (on-the-spot) applications of such technologies and their 
uses, but also for the development of ‘new’ technology. The typical empirical indicator is cumulative 
capacity, as it is assumed that this type of learning grows as more of the technology is applied. 
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Table 3. Empirical studies of differential impacts of environmental policy instruments 
Authors Main focus Policy driver and indicator Dataset Main result 
Indirect instruments 
Greene (1990) Diffusion 
Gasoline prices vs. CAFE 
standards on increasing fuel 
economy 
15 sets of manufacturer 
CAFE data for 1978–89 
CAFE standards were a significant constraint for many 
manufacturers, and were perhaps twice as influential as 
gasoline prices 
Jaffe and Stavins 
(1995) Diffusion 
Energy price vs. building codes 
on adoption of thermal insulation 
technologies in new residential 
construction 
US state-level data on 
thermal insulation 1979–88  
Mean energy efficiency increases with higher energy prices 
(adoption decisions are more sensitive to upfront cost than to 
longer-term operation expenses) 
Newell, Jaffe and 
Stavins (1999) 
Invention and 
innovation 
Energy price vs. regulation on 
new models offered for sale 
Energy characteristics of air 
conditioners and gas water 
heaters 1958–93 
Rate of overall innovation independent of, but direction 
responsive to, energy prices and regulations; in particular, 
subset of technologically feasible models offered for sale 
Direct instruments 
Revelt and Train 
(1998)  Diffusion 
Rebates or loans on high-
efficiency appliances for 
households  
6,081 choice experiments of 
401 customers in US 
Demand Side Management is effective, but loans have larger 
impact than rebates (plus more profitable for firm) 
Kerr and Newell 
(2003)  Diffusion 
CAC and TDP under US lead 
phase-down  378 US refineries 1971–95 
Increased stringency encouraged greater adoption of new 
technology; differential between adoption propensity of 
expected permit sellers relative to expected permit buyers 
higher under TDP than under CAC 
Carlson et al. 
(2000) Diffusion 
CAAA with CAC and TDP-SO2 
on marginal abatement costs 
734 units of US power 
plants 1985–94 
Declining marginal abatement cost for both CAC and TDP 
due to fuel switching and technological change (time trend!); 
cost savings (relatively) larger under TDP  
Lange and Bellas 
(2005) 
Innovation 
and diffusion  
CAAA with CAC and TDP-SO2 
on scrubber cost  
Comparison of 157 pre- and 
40 post-CAAA boilers in US 
power plants 1985–2002 
More recent scrubbers cheaper to purchase and operate than 
older scrubbers, but cost reductions seem to be one-time drop 
rather than continual decline 
Popp (2003) 
Invention and 
innovation 
CAAA with CAC and TDP-SO2 
on patents of scrubbers 
180 FGD units in US power 
plants 1972–97 
Little evidence that new patents before 1990 improved ability 
of scrubber technology; patents granted during TDP system of 
1990s improved removal efficiency of scrubbers 
CAA = Clean Air Act 
CAAA = Clean Air Act Amendments 1990 
CAFE = corporate average fuel economy 
FGD = flue gas desulphurization 
TDP = tradable permits 
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The first set of studies use variation in energy prices as a proxy for variation in the stringency of 
market-based instruments and compare their effects with those of CAC instruments. Note that a 
rise in the energy price is also likely to shift technological change towards less energy-intensive 
technologies, the use of which, in turn, also reduces emissions as long as energy and emissions are 
complements. In particular, several studies use hedonic price functions to examine the effects of 
public policy in the contexts of home appliances and of the energy efficiency of cars. Such cases 
are used to study the differential impact of instruments on variation in different indicators of 
technological change.  
 The interesting study by Newell, Jaffe and Stavins (1999) uses a product-characteristics 
approach to evaluate the relative impact of energy prices and changes in energy-efficiency 
standards. This approach captures the important effect of invention creating new ‘models’ with 
characteristics not previously feasible and of innovation commercializing models that were not 
previously offered for sale.14 The authors apply their approach to the changing energy 
characteristics of models of air conditioners and gas water heaters between 1958 and 1993. The 
evidence suggests that the rate of innovation was independent of energy prices and regulations, 
whereas its direction is induced for some products. Energy price changes also had a considerable 
effect on the subset of technically feasible models offered for sale, and this responsiveness 
increased substantially after product labelling was required. Regulations worked largely through 
energy-inefficient models being dropped (‘exit’), which is in fact the intended effect of energy-
efficiency standards.  
 Two other, somewhat older, studies examined indirect effects of changes in implicit 
emissions prices, such as changing fuel prices. The study of Greene (1990), for instance, looked at 
the interesting practical experiment provided by standards imposed on the fuel efficiency of cars. 
Before his study it was reported that the fuel efficiency of new cars in the US responds more than 
proportionally to changes in (expected) fuel prices (as explained by Jaffe, Newell and Stavins, 
2002, pp. 60–61). Greene, however, showed that the CAFE standards introduced by the US 
government also had an effect, in particular for US automobile manufacturing firms. He estimated 
that the CAFE constraint was binding for US-based firms but not for foreign (European and 
Japanese) firms. Specifically, CAFE standards had perhaps twice as much influence as gasoline 
                                                     
14. According to this approach, induced innovation is the movement in the frontier of feasible models that 
reduce the cost of energy efficiency in terms of other attributes (see Newell et al. (1999), pp. 943ff). 
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prices. Accordingly, the experiment in the car market suggests that the responsiveness of 
technological change to prices is significant, but also that binding standards could be exploited as 
an important vehicle for technological change. 
 The study by Jaffe and Stavins (1995) also looked at the relative importance of CAC 
versus market-based instruments for the diffusion of new technology. In particular, they evaluated 
the role that (changes in) energy prices and building codes had on adoption of thermal insulation 
technologies in new residential construction in the US between 1979 and 1988. They found that 
the mean energy efficiency increases with higher energy prices and rising adoption cost. Using an 
economic model to explain the relative magnitudes, their estimates suggest that ad valorem energy 
taxes in the 10–25% range have noticeable impacts on the energy efficiency of new homes, and 
that this impact would be felt rather quickly. Adoption subsidies of similar magnitude would have 
an even larger impact because adoption decisions were found to be more sensitive to upfront cost 
than to longer-term operation expenses (Jaffe and Stavins, 1995, p. 59). As far as direct regulation 
is concerned, they also did not find any discernible effects on building practices. This might 
provide some evidence that if (new) standards are set below existing standards, they will have no 
effect on the margin, whereas energy taxes (and subsidies) always do. 
 Further evidence that reducing upfront cost (or postponing cost) does have considerable 
impact on adoption decisions is provided by the paper of Revelt and Train (1998). They studied 
the relative importance of rebates or loans for the adoption of high-efficiency appliances by 
households in the US. The typical subsidy employed under the Demand Side Management (DSM) 
approach by the US electric utilities is a rebate to induce households to adopt these appliances. To 
study the potential effect of loans, Revelt and Train used stated-preference data to estimate the 
effect of loans relative to the effect of rebates. Using 6,081 choice experiments of 401 customers, 
they concluded that DSM is effective but that loans have larger impact than rebates. This is 
surprising because if upfront costs were the basic problem, the individual would prefer the rebate 
over a loan (of equivalent money). As explained by Revelt and Train (1998, p. 652), however, 
individuals may not be indifferent and they may see the subsidy as a signal. It is clear for a loan 
that the lender makes money from it, but a rebate is a ‘giveaway’ and customers may wonder what 
its motivation is. If individuals start wondering about its motivation, their behaviour is likely to be 
affected. For instance, if an individual is suspicious about the benefactor, he or she might not buy 
the appliance, just for that reason.  
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 Finally, at least four recent studies have analysed CAC instruments against the use of 
tradable permits. I start with a recent study by Kerr and Newell (2003) on the relative 
effectiveness of CAC and tradable permits in the US lead phase-down in the 1980s. This was the 
first case where TDP were applied in practice, in particular in controlling the lead in leaded 
gasoline between 1983 and 1987. Kerr and Newell employed a unique panel on 378 US petroleum 
refineries between 1971 and 1995 to study adoption decisions by refineries of lead-reducing 
technology under different regulatory regimes.15 Diffusion is considerably different under the two 
regulatory regimes. In particular, the positive differential in the adoption propensity of expected 
permit sellers (i.e. low-cost refineries) relative to expected permit buyers (i.e. high-cost refineries) 
was greater under the market-based regime than under individually-binding, but non-tradable, 
performance standards.  
 The remaining three studies all focus on the differential dynamic impact of TDP and 
CAC in the case of the US Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), which have allowed emissions 
trading since 1990. These case studies clarify why identification of such impacts is difficult and 
therefore provide further evidence of the importance of proper comparison between policy 
regimes applied in practice. First of all, Carlson et al. (2000) make clear why simple correlations 
between the introduction of an instrument, such as allowance trading in the case of CAAA, and 
abatement cost reductions should be treated with care. As they explain in detail, some officials 
suggest that the introduction of allowance trading of SO2 was the main reason for the strong 
decline in abatement cost of SO2 as measured by the permit price. Indeed, ex-ante estimates of 
marginal abatement costs produced at the time that the CAAA were written were as high as 
$1,500, whereas the allowance price, which is an ex-post signal of marginal abatement costs, was 
only around $100 in 1997. Instead of making inferences about the causality of the introduction of 
the allowance scheme, one might equally well see this as evidence that the (ex-ante) estimate was 
simply wrong. Similarly, it would be false to attribute this effect to the trading mechanism per se 
as well as to dynamic effects that would have been caused by this scheme.  
 Carlson et al. (2000) aim to distinguish carefully between reduction in abatement cost 
due to trading on the one hand and other reasons, such as fuel substitution or the instalment of 
                                                     
15. Kerr and Newell’s (2003) evaluation is based on a theoretical model of technology adoption. According to 
this model, firms adopt gradually if costs fall and increased stringency increases the value of adoption. 
Firms with lower benefits or higher costs will adopt more slowly. Divergence in adoption propensity 
between low- and high-compliance-cost plants is also expected under different regulatory regimes, in 
particular under a TDP system and an individually-binding performance standard. 
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new technology, on the other hand. They estimate marginal SO2 abatement costs for 734 units of 
US power plants between 1985 and 1994. Their estimates suggest that the decline in marginal 
abatement costs could be attributed to technical improvements (as measured through the time 
effect), including advances in the ability to burn low-sulphur coal at existing generators, as well as 
to improvements in overall generating efficiency, but mostly to a decline in fuel costs. Further 
estimations to identify the potential gains from trade under the TDP regime suggest that under 
both CAC (phase I) and the allowance regime (phase II) marginal abatement costs have fallen.16 
Finally, this study provides estimates of potential cost savings of trade and show that they are (and 
will be) considerable for the TDP regime.  
 The paper by Lange and Bellas (2005) focuses on the effects of the policy differential on 
advancement in scrubber technology only. As discussed earlier, Bellas (1998) found little 
evidence for cost advances of new technologies as employed by power plants in the pre-CAAA 
period from 1970 to 1991. Bellas only found learning effects over the use of existing 
technologies. In their paper, Lange and Bellas estimate the effects of allowance trading on 
scrubber costs using a hedonic model. The model does not focus on the reduction in compliance 
cost, but on the scrubbing costs instead, in order to isolate a potential dynamic (technology) effect. 
Like the paper by Newell, Jaffe and Stavins (1999), this paper identifies technological change by 
adjusting cost changes for design and operating parameters. Lange and Bellas find that more 
recent scrubbers are cheaper to purchase and operate than older scrubbers, but also that these cost 
reductions are a one-time drop rather than a continual decline.  
 Popp (2003) also looks at advances in scrubber technology, in particular at the invention 
stage. He combines the filing of new patents for scrubbing technology with the actual instalment 
of this technology in 180 FGD units in US power plants between 1972 and 1997 to study the 
effect of these patents on pollution control. He finds that the level of innovation for FGD units, 
measured by the number of successful patent applications per year, was actually higher before 
permits were introduced in 1990. However, the new patents from before 1990 have not improved 
the removal efficiency of scrubbers. Innovation focused only on reducing operating costs, which 
is basically in line with the finding by Lange and Bellas (2005) for the same period.17 After the 
                                                     
16. Note that, as a consequence, the gains from trade should fall as well (see Carlson et al. (2000), p. 1295). 
17. There remains a difference, however, as to whether operating cost did fall prior to the CAAA of 1990 
(Popp, 2003) or did not (Bellas, 1998). 
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allowance system was introduced, innovation not only lowered scrubber costs but also improved 
removal efficiency. Accordingly, the change to market-based environmental regulation did not 
induce more innovation, but led to more environmentally-friendly innovation. 
 Clearly, the introduction of allowance trading of SO2 for electric utilities in the US has 
had an impact on the direction of technological change in this area. This impact, however, very 
much depends on how it is identified. In particular, as also noted by Popp (2005, p. 219), the type 
of policy affects the nature of innovation, and this nature remains hidden in overall abatement cost 
estimates with a time trend measuring technological change. These insights illustrate that the 
effect of environmental policy on technological change may not always be properly identified by 
looking at abatement cost changes alone. Together, the studies reviewed in this section illustrate 
how difficult it is to identify dynamic impacts of policy instruments, in particular their differential 
impact. One serious drawback is again that these studies are all for the US only, and it would be 
interesting to see whether or not the use of market-based regulation in other countries might be 
location- or culture-specific.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The papers reviewed here clearly observe changes in invention, innovation and diffusion of 
technologies, although the direct causal link with environmental policy is not always clear in 
specific cases. The overall conclusion seems justified that environmental policy in general has an 
impact on at least the direction of technological change. This conclusion holds regardless of the 
type of instrument applied, i.e. whether CAC or market-based instruments are used. Indeed, in the 
early days of environmental regulation, the focus was almost entirely on standard-setting through 
technology prescriptions (e.g. prescriptions of ‘best available techniques’). Prescriptions are 
almost by definition technology-forcing and binding because they impose constraints on 
emissions and therefore also reduce the number of options in the emissions–output possibility set. 
The most important effect of this (standard-setting) policy – also corroborated by several of the 
studies reviewed here – is that it induces exit of the dirtiest firms operating in the market.  
 Equally impressive are the strong correlations between specific regulations and the R&D 
process as measured through patenting behaviour. One telling example is Popp’s (2003) finding 
that the new regulatory environment in the US after the Clean Air Act (CAA) came into force 
shifts inventions and innovations to further improvements of existing flue gas desulphurization 
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(FGD) models in power plants. This is easy to understand because the CAA allows firms to 
exploit rents from (emission) permits trading. Apparently, and in line with what economists 
suggest, innovators look carefully for rent opportunities, which in turn depend on the specific 
incentives signalled by the design of (environmental) policy. This is also precisely what could be 
learned from cases providing indirect evidence of price incentives, such as the rise (and decline) 
in fossil fuel prices (e.g. Newell, Jaffe and Stavins, 1999). Emissions reductions clearly benefit 
from taking a free ride on higher implicit emissions prices due to rising energy prices, because 
most fossil fuel use is closely linked to air quality emissions. Changes in energy prices induce 
invention, innovation and diffusion towards more energy-efficient technologies, the use of which, 
in turn, has a positive impact on lowering emissions levels as well.  
 If incentives are so important and technological change is so sensitive to the type of 
regulation being applied, the old adage of economists that market-based instruments have stronger 
dynamic impacts deserves some nuancing. The evidence here is somewhat different from what 
might be expected from the early environmental economics literature on instruments. In 
particular, the papers suggest that standards imposed under CAC also provide clear signals as to 
what physical properties of production processes are undesirable (Helfand, 1991), which in turn 
could be targeted by inventors. Standard-driven technological change is directed by the physical 
signal given by the standard. For instance, if the standard is in gram emission per unit of time, 
inventors are likely to focus on any new technology that reduces this particular target. Instead, the 
greater flexibility provided by TDP systems might also direct both R&D and innovation efforts 
towards using the flexibility opportunities of existing or ‘known’ technology only. An important 
topic for future empirical research would be to see whether market-based instruments indeed 
create ‘environmental technology’ crowding-out effects, i.e. investments in R&D and innovation 
away from entirely new opportunities or ‘breakthrough’ technologies.  
 If the design of signals is so important (e.g. Laffont and Tirole, 1996), this issue should 
also be taken more seriously in future empirical research of the dynamic impact of environmental 
instruments. First of all, an interesting issue is to study more explicitly the type of signals used to 
induce agents to change their behaviour. Current empirical assessments have a tendency to be 
biased towards observable (‘hard’) information, such as changes in abatement costs, number of 
patents (citations) and physical characteristics of technologies. Apart from serious identification 
problems, such as whether abatement cost measures properly account for technological change, 
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the studies discussed in this review therefore simply neglect effects of regulation on ‘soft’ 
information, such as organizational design and changes in attitudes.18  
 Second, more empirical research on the timing and commitment by the regulator is 
important. Currently, little or nothing is known about the role of the regulator itself and his 
interaction with the regulated agents over time. Moreover, the link between different regulators in 
an international setting and technological change is a very interesting topic. It is quite likely that, 
for instance, international diffusion of knowledge is also sensitive to international cooperation. 
While diffusion of knowledge has been studied more generally (e.g. Keller, 2004), little work 
addresses explicitly the links between environmental policy and speed of diffusion between 
foreign and domestic knowledge (‘international technology transfers’). 
 Third, we now know that the conditions under which specific instruments would be 
equivalent are quite demanding. For instance, an ad valorem tax is equivalent to a specific tax in 
terms of economic incidence only if monopoly power is absent or quality differentials of goods do 
not matter and are not mutable (see, for instance, Keen, 1998). For environmental externalities, 
however, quality differentials and changes are the heart of the matter. The relevant incidence – 
from a social perspective – is precisely in terms of the effectiveness of the internalization of 
specific physical externalities. Learning more about the dynamic effects of specific designs of 
instruments, such as taxes, subsidies, standards or TDP systems, on quality change is therefore 
crucial. For instance, subsidies are usually targeted to specific technologies (a firm is only eligible 
for a subsidy if it invests in technology X). The dynamic impact of a subsidy therefore crucially 
depends on the targeting choice with respect to the technology that is subsidized. In the same way, 
the effect of a tax may depend on the signal the tax sends by its choice of the tax base: the 
stronger the linkage to specific emissions, the more directed the search for new technologies is 
likely to be. Empirical research identifying these types of differences in impact between 
instruments would be most welcome in the future.  
                                                     
18. There is a growing literature trying to empirically investigate these linkages as well. See, in particular, 
Labonne and Johnstone (2006) and Rennings et al. (2006). 
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